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As a persistent phenomenon in both morality and religion, 
hypocrisy has often been discussed, the result being that two 
major types of it are usually distinguished. First, there is the 
kind most familiar to modern English and classical Greek: 
hypocrisy as feigning goodness while in reality being evil. I t  is 
being two-faced. I t  is saying one thing and meaning another. 
Although this type of hypocrisy is rarely mentioned in the Bible, 
there is a fine example of it in Lk 20:19-26 (cf. Mt 22:15-22 and 
Mk 12:13-17) where certain individuals who "pretended to be 
sincere" sought to ensnare Jesus. Second, there is the kind found 
frequently in the Old and New Testaments: hypocrisy as un- 
warranted self-righteousness that is blind to one's own sins and 
harsh toward the sins of others. I t  is seeing the tiny speck in 
another person's character more clearly than the huge blot in one's 
own (cf. Mt 7:3-5 and Lk 6:41-42). I t  should be noted that in 
the first case the hypocrite is generally more aware of the hypocrisy 
than anyone else, whereas in the second case almost everyone is 
more aware of the hypocrisy than the hypocrite. 
All this, of course, is to cover familiar ground. My intention is 
to move from this starting point into an exploration of relatively 
new territory. Specifically, what I wish to do here is to distinguish 
a third major type of hypocrisy-one which is much more subtle 
and therefore much more difficult to discern than the others. 
I shall begin by characterizing this third type of hypocrisy more 
fully. Having done that, I will suggest where it fits in with the 
biblical perspective. I shall then proceed t o  make some observa- 
tions about its relationship to two important ethical theories, and 
finally will conclude with remarks on the special danger this 
particular hypocrisy holds for Christians. 
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1. Characteristics of the "T hird-T y pe" Hypocrisy 
The third type of hypocrisy has significant similarities and 
dissimilarities with the other two types. I t  is similar to the first in 
that the individual is more evil than appearances would indicate 
and similar to the second in that the individual is more self- 
righteous than the truth would warrant. However, it is dissimilar 
to the first in that the hypocrite is not, at least consciously, 
attempting to deceive anyone and dissimilar to the second in that 
the hypocrite is not, at least openly, condemnatory of others. 
Because of this peculiar combination of features, the third-type 
hypocrisy is seldom recognized by either hypocrite or observer. 
While important variations no doubt exist among those who 
fall into this third category of hypocrisy, it would be useful to 
examine a more detailed picture of one such person. For con- 
venience, we will designate that individual as "M." M is probably 
regarded as a pillar of church and community, perhaps even as a 
saint (or as close to that as most humans are apt to get). After 
all, M is never loud, harsh, aggressive, demanding, critical, or 
argumentative-even in the face of considerable provocation. 
M is also likely to be an advocate of what many view as the 
h ighs t  and purest ethical positions: anti-war, anti-violence, anti- 
discrimination, and anti-sensual indulgence of any kind (such as 
sex, food, alcohol, etc.). As a consequence, M leads what 
most Christians today see as a simple, ascetic life. All in all, M 
is a near embodiment of the famous monkey trio-seeing no evil, 
hearing no evil, and speaking no evil. 
Given this sort of public posture and given the harmony of 
public and private life, how could a person like M ever be classed 
as a hypocrite? Only, I believe, by a careful and lengthy study 
of behavior patterns. What one discovers is that no matter what 
is said or done, no matter what decisions are made or actions 
taken, and no matter what reasons or justifications for them are 
offered, all things consistently work together to the advantage of 
an individual such as M and to the detriment of other persons. 
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Those who are third-type hypocrites are classed as such because 
they possess this crucial characteristic of pure egoism inside 
covered by a veneer of altruism and benevolence outside. In 
other words, these people never act primarily for the sake of 
others; and even where they give the impression of doing so, the 
purpose of the act is selfish (i.e., self-centered). 
As was suggested earlier, this type of hypocrisy is so deeply 
rooted that it does not function on a conscious level and tends 
to remain well disguised from both public and private view. Yet, 
I suspect that almost every reader can now recall examples of the 
third-type hypocrisy. Once hypocrisy is suspected, evidence can 
often be accumulated to confirm it. But since third-category 
hypocrisy operates in such an apparently innocuous manner, 
initial suspicions are rather rare. 
2. "Third-Type" Hypocrisy in Relationship to the 
Biblical Perspective 
We now move on to consider how third-type hypocrisy relates 
to the biblical perspective. There is no question but that the Bible 
in general and the NT in particular would regard the life-style 
we have been describing as indeed being a form of hypocrisy 
and would condemn it. Great prophetic voices from Amos onward 
have stressed the inner life and emphasized the need for har- 
monizing inner life and outer behavior; words and deeds are 
to flow directly from thoughts and dispositions, but in the event of 
some disparity between them, ethical judgments are to be in 
terms of the latter factors rather than the former ones. Jesus, too, 
harking back to the prophets, placed his main concern on a 
person's intentions and motivations. He spoke of an inner 
transformation which cannot be compelled and which, at the 
same time, cannot be measured solely in terms of an individual's 
outward behavior (see, for example, Mk 7:l-23 and compare 
with Jer 31:31-34). 
Indeed, there is some evidence that Jesus himself both noted 
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and condemned the very type of hypocrisy we are discussing 
here. Certainly the sort of hypocrisy Jesus rebuked in Mt 6:2, 5, 
16 (regarding alms, prayer, and fasting) and in Mt 23:23-36 (re- 
garding neglect of the weightier matters and having a clean out- 
ward appearance overlying inward corruption) bears a stronger 
resemblance to the third type than to the second, for the harshness 
of the hypocrite toward others is absent. And one can easily 
read Jesus' parable of the Prodigal Son (Lk 15:ll-32) in terms 
of the elder brother's being a third-type hypocrite-at least until 
an unusual and unexpected situation developed that brought his 
real, deep, and hidden feelings to the surface. In fact, this type of 
hypocrisy may most often be exposed to hypocrite and observer 
alike when some immense crisis or frustration breaks down th,e 
defenses and permits long-buried, yet still-festering, ugliness to 
spring forth into the light of day. 
3. "Third-Type" Hypocrisy and Ethical Theories 
The points made so far may cause one to wonder how this 
state of affairs is possible. How can an individual be so blind 
about his or her true motivations? How can an egoist be so 
completely unaware of his or her own selfishness? How can a 
person regularly do (or fail to do) things which harm others 
without even noticing it? Part of the answer, of course, lies in 
the insight of psychology that the real causes of our thoughts 
and deeds are frequently hidden from consciousness, from the 
""rational self." The remainder of the answer, however, lies 
embedded in the very nature of ethical theories. 
We can find this third major type of hypocrisy among adher- 
ents of situational ethics, wherein a person tries to decide in the 
uniqueness of each situation what the law of love demands.' 
I t  is possible for decisions always to be made in such a way as to 
favor oneself, since the basic principle of situational ethics is so 
general and because its application is so subjective. Indeed, in 
For a presentation of this viewpoint, see Joseph F. Fletcher, Situation 
Ethics: The New Morality (Philadelphia, 1966). 
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treating the "new morality" Gabriel Fackre discusses this very 
problem with which we are dealing, although he does not call it 
"hypocrisy."2 
But we can also discover this third major type of hypocrisy 
among advocates of rule ethics. As we know, when rules are 
chosen, they always involve a selection from among the total 
possible rules. And we know that this selection usually includes 
more negatives ("Thou shalt nots") than positives ("Thou 
shalts"). The assumption of rule ethics is that if one abides by 
these selected, and largely negative, rules, then he or she is 
righteous. The trap here is that the third-type hyprocrite (either 
by selection of a system of convenient rules or by disposition or 
inattention to the full implications of the rules) knows that he or 
she is righteous for the simple reason that he or she abides by 
those rules. And if one is convinced of one's own righteousness, 
then it will likely seem unnecessary to have continual self- 
examination of motives, actions, thoughts, et cetera. In fact, it is 
an almost impossible task to shatter the complacency of such 
people, since their perception of reality is both filtered and 
skewed; besides, the fact that these people are neither two-faced 
like the type-one hypocrites nor harsh like the type-two hypocrites 
makes them improbable candidates for sufficiently direct con- 
frontation. 
4. The Danger of the "Third-Type" Hypocrisy 
There is a final, yet significant, point which needs to be made 
about this third-type hypocrisy. I indicated at the beginning that 
this sort of hypocrisy poses special problems for the Christian. 
Why? To find the answer, we might start by asking why such 
people seem to see and hear so little evil. Is it because there is so 
little evil around to see and hear? Certainly not! It is part of their 
highly selective perspective on reality ( a  defense mechanism, if 
you please) which says, in effect, that if there is no evil outside of 
Gabriel Fackre, "The New Morality," in Storm over Ethics (Philadelphia, 
1967), pp. 70-75. 
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me (i.e., intentional evil and not merely evil resulting from mis- 
takes), then there is no evil inside of me either. Indeed, I would 
contend that in many cases a person's ability to look around and 
see no evil in others, even when it is there, is a strong indication 
that he or she will see no evil within, even when it is there. 
But why is this a danger for Christians? May it not be because 
Christians, especially in recent decades, have been so fearful of 
imperfections in themselves (presumably on the ground that 
such imperfections would disqualify them for membership and/or 
leadership in the Christian community on earth and in heaven) 
that they feel compelled to deny any imperfections in themselves? 
In any event, the result is that the sin and evil which does exist 
(cf. Rom 1: 18-20 and 5:12 on the prevalence of sin) must, for 
many Christians at least, be "explained away9'-must be rational- 
ized, repressed, or sublimated. Unfortunately, this tactic makes 
sin less visible and, simultaneously, more difficult to eliminate. 
A good example of this tendency can be found in Langdon 
Gilkey's Shantung Compound, a narrative account of his experi- 
ences in a prisoner-of-war camp during the Second World War.3 
He depicts Christians, along with others influenced by Christian 
ethics, as sublimating their true impulses and repfacing them with 
a more socially acceptable f a~ade .  Yet the true impulses con- 
tinued to control their behavior. Mary Daly, though from a dif- 
ferent slant, also makes the same point.' She maintains that much 
so-called Christian morality stifles honesty, conceals true motives 
and values, and lowers critical consciousness. 
I believe there is a close relationship between this phe- 
nomenon and an individual's theological position or outlook. 
Certainly, this is true with regard to examples we noted earlier 
from the NT. In our own time, too, there would appear to be a 
close correlation between one's theology and one's chances of 
8Langdon Gilkey, Shantung Compound: The Story of Men and Women 
under Pressure (New York, 1966). 
Mary Daly, Beyond God the Father: Toward a Philosophy of Women's 
Liberation (Boston, 1973), p. 102. 
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becoming a type-three hypocrite. Christians who have a very 
optimistic conception of human nature would, I suspect, be the 
most prone to this kind of hypocrisy; and since contemporary 
western culture is heavily influenced by this and other liberal 
presuppositions, that connection is surely important. Neo-Ortho- 
doxy, because of its pessimistic conception of human nature, 
would probably be the least prone to this sort of hypocrisy; and 
"Conservative" Christianity would seem to belong somewhere 
near the middle of the spectrum. 
Hypocrisy of all kinds should be studied carefully. After all, 
only when we are able to identify it correctly can we develop 
appropriate means of containing and then eliminating it. The 
"new" type of hypocrisy we have been exploring here is 
especially significant because of its relative invisibility and be- 
cause it is a tempting trap for the modern Christian. 
